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REED v. TOWN OF GILBERT: 
RELAX, EVERYBODY 
ENRIQUE ARMIJO* 
Abstract: In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a law is 
content-based if it draws distinctions on its face based on the message an affected 
speaker conveys. Reed rejected previous lower court interpretations of the 
Court’s content discrimination doctrine, which had consistently held that a con-
tent-based law was not subject to strict scrutiny if its reference to content was not 
based on government disapproval of that content. Reed has set off a firestorm. 
The justices who concurred in the judgment warned that the case’s rule would 
cast doubt on a range of government action historically considered to not impli-
cate the First Amendment, from securities regulation to product labeling. Com-
mentators have called Reed everything from a “groundbreaker” to a “redefini-
tion” of content discrimination doctrine that will have “profound consequences.” 
The message of this Article is that Reed’s critics should, in a word, relax. Close 
review of those areas in which Reed’s critics claim the case will cause the most 
harm demonstrates that other parts of First Amendment doctrine, all of which 
survive Reed, will limit the case’s reach. The case also clarified several murky 
areas of that doctrine. Additionally, the focus on Reed obscures a far more im-
portant issue: the fallacy of continuing to use a categorical approach to First 
Amendment cases that turns entirely on whether or not a given law refers to con-
tent and ignores a law’s actual effect on speech. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that, for purposes of First Amendment review, a court should deem a speech-
restrictive law content-based, and thus presumptively unconstitutional, if the 
law “‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message a speaker con-
veys.”1 In doing so, the Court rejected prior interpretations of its cases that had 
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 1 Reed v. Town of Gilbert (Reed III), 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563–64 (2011)). 
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held governments could make facial references to a particular type or category 
of content in their laws so long as those laws were not referring to that content 
in order to express disagreement with or disapproval of it. 
The Court’s opinion in Reed thus ratified a “First Amendment Two-Step” 
with an order of decision should be familiar to administrative law students. 
Step One is a facial inquiry, and Step Two is a purpose inquiry. At Step One, if 
a law’s text makes any reference to content, then “that is the end of the matter,” 
to import a Chevron term, at least with respect to determining whether scrutiny 
is strict.2 If a reviewing court answers Step One in the affirmative, then it may 
not inquire into Step Two: whether the regulation in question is adopted, as the 
lower court in Reed had held, “because of disagreement with the message it 
conveys.”3 Reed’s Step Two, however, does apply to facially content-neutral 
laws; a reviewing court can also subject those laws to strict scrutiny if the gov-
ernment adopted the law under review because of disagreement with the mes-
sage expressed by the speech the law infringes upon—or, in the words of the 
Court, “when the purpose and justification for the [content-neutral] law are 
content based.”4 Accordingly, and contrary to how the lower courts previously 
understood and applied content discrimination doctrine, government purpose 
in First Amendment law is a one-way ratchet that moves only toward strict 
scrutiny. Even a benign (or at least non-content-related) purpose cannot save a 
law that refers to content from the most rigorous constitutional standard of re-
view. 
Much wringing of hands and gnashing of teeth followed Reed—
including, and for starters, by the three justices who concurred in the case. Jus-
tice Samuel Alito felt compelled to list no fewer than nine hypothetical sign 
regulations that he claimed would survive the Court’s Step One—some of 
which quite obviously did in fact make facial references to content and would 
therefore likely fail, or at least have to survive strict scrutiny, under the majori-
ty’s test.5 Justice Stephen Breyer, consistent with his prior opinions in First 
Amendment cases, called for a more nuanced approach than the “content based 
= strict scrutiny” formula, pointing to a range of content-based restrictions on 
speech for which the application of strict scrutiny would not be appropriate, 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). In its landmark 
1984 case Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court estab-
lished a two-step procedure for evaluating an agency’s interpretation of a statute. See id. at 842–43. 
 3 Reed v. Town of Gilbert (Reed II), 707 F.3d 1057, 1071 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted), 
rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
 4 Reed III, 135 S. Ct. at 2228. 
 5 Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring) (referring to rules “distinguishing between on-premises and 
off-premises signs” or “imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time event”). 
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such as securities regulation and drug-labeling requirements.6 Finally, Justice 
Elena Kagan, who, like Justice Breyer, only concurred in the judgment, sound-
ed the alarm. 
In Justice Kagan’s view, the majority’s First Amendment Two-Step would 
not only threaten the ability of any government to regulate private signage but 
also a host of other non-censorial laws that refer to content. The content in-
quiry, in Justice Kagan’s view, should follow its “intended function”—to de-
termine whether a law’s reference to expressive subject matter might be at-
tributable to the government’s “favor[ing] or disfavor[ing] certain view-
points.”7 To Justice Kagan, the majority’s adoption of a First Amendment Two-
Step that bifurcates consideration of the law’s face from its purpose draws too 
bright a line. It forecloses the possibility that some references to content should 
not draw strict scrutiny where the government’s purposes for doing so are be-
nign. Following Justice Kagan’s lead, commentators in the national media 
characterized Reed as a “transform[ation] [of] the First Amendment” that 
would apply “exceptional skepticism” to “countless laws” that refer to con-
tent.8 Other legal analysts and academics have similarly characterized Reed as 
a First Amendment game-changer, calling it the “harbinger of the sign code 
apocalypse,”9 and a “groundbreaking” decision,10 one whose holding reached 
“more broadly than necessary,” which will cause “unintended consequences” 
in not just signage codes but in a wide range of areas historically considered 
fair game for governmental regulation.11 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Id. at 2234–35 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Vet-
erans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2243–53 (2015) (Justice Breyer writing for the majority in a First 
Amendment case, holding that specialty plates were government speech); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S.786, 839–58 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 7 Reed III, 135 S. Ct. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 8 Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching Consequences, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech-expansion-has-
far-reaching-consequences.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/JYJ2-D8WU] (including commentary by, 
inter alia, Yale Law School Dean Robert Post). 
 9 Sarah J. Adams-Schoen, Reed Applied: The Sign Apocalypse or Another Bump in the Road, 
ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., July/Aug. 2016, at 4. 
 10 Matthew Hector, Groundbreaking Supreme Court Opinion Dooms Panhandling Law, ILL. B.J., 
Oct. 2015, at 12. 
 11 Richard J. Lazarus, Back to “Business” at the Supreme Court: The “Administrative Side” of 
Chief Justice Roberts, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 33, 60 n.161 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/
11/back-to-business-at-the-supreme-court-the-administrative-side-of-chief-justice-roberts/ [https://
perma.cc/RZ9R-F6ZS]; see also Anthony D. Lauriello, Note, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2016) (stating that Reed will “likely . . . have pro-
found consequences on a broad array of subjects” and represents a “coming sea change in how Ameri-
can municipalities regulate their streets”) (citation omitted); Urja Mittal, The “Supreme Board of Sign 
Review”: Reed and Its Aftermath, 125 YALE L.J. F. 359, 359 (2016), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
forum/the-supreme-board-of-sign-review-reed-and-its-aftermath [https://perma.cc/AR2D-BTV7] 
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The message of this Article is that those claiming Reed has upended the 
Court’s content inquiry in First Amendment cases and severely limited gov-
ernments’ ability to protect the public in a range of other areas should, in a 
word, relax. As Part I shows, and as evidenced already by the lower court opin-
ions applying Reed’s First Amendment Two-Step, the case and its subsequent 
applications simply confirm that the burden of defending any law referencing 
content rests with the government.12 Nor does Reed present any great threat to 
consumer-protective regulations that have historically been considered valid 
despite their references to content. In fact, as Part II argues, Reed’s reduction of 
the role that government purpose should play in cases involving content-based 
laws is a welcome development.13 Finally and most importantly, Part III 
demonstrates that focusing on Reed as a radical departure from First Amend-
ment doctrine obscures a more fundamental issue with far greater ramifications 
for the freedom of expression: the Court’s continued use of a rigid distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral laws when determining the stand-
ard of review to be applied to a regulation that infringes upon speech.14 
I. THE REED FIRST AMENDMENT: SAME AS THE OLD BOSS 
A fuller contemplation of Reed’s effects would consider its applications in 
four primary categories, all alluded to by the case’s critics. Section A discusses 
future signage restrictions cases.15 Section B examines cases involving pan-
handling.16 Section C explores the statutory regime around intellectual proper-
ty, which uses a decision-making apparatus that often takes content into ac-
count.17 Section D reviews more generally—and more importantly—cases in-
volving laws such as securities and labeling regulations that compel speech in 
furtherance of consumer protection-related governmental interests.18 Finally, 
Section E looks at Reed’s effects on criminal law.19 Despite the critics’ protes-
tations, however, Reed has not caused any great harm to governments’ law-
making discretion in any of these areas. 
                                                                                                                           
(noting that Reed’s “redefinition of content discrimination” “revolutionize[d]” First Amendment doc-
trine). 
 12 See infra notes 15–111 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 112–122 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 123–148 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 20–48 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 61–78 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 79–96 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 97–111 and accompanying text. 
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A. Signage Restrictions 
Notwithstanding Justice Kagan’s claims in her Reed concurrence that the 
laws of “[c]ountless cities and towns across America . . . are now in jeop-
ardy,”20 it is difficult to see why applying more rigorous constitutional review 
to sign ordinances will wreak any great change in First Amendment law. As an 
initial matter, it is certainly so that post-Reed, sign ordinances making refer-
ence to content in the same way as the ordinance at issue in Reed itself will not 
survive strict scrutiny. This is so not merely because of the Reed decision, but 
also because of a long line of cases finding that government interests in aes-
thetics and safety concerns related to signage, such as lost or distracted drivers, 
are not compelling.21 That being said, other parts of First Amendment law, 
perhaps needless to say all of which survived Reed, will preserve municipali-
ties’ ability to regulate signage without infringing on speech. 
First and foremost, there is the commercial speech doctrine. For so long 
as the Court continues to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial 
speech (an open question, to be sure, though the commercial speech doctrine 
seems safe at least for now22), Reed’s reach will be inherently limited. Courts 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Reed III, 135 S. Ct. at 2236, 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring) (referencing the laws of “thousands 
of towns”). 
 21 See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 738 (8th Cir. 2011); 
Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565, 1569–70 (11th Cir. 1993); Whitton v. City of Glad-
stone, 832 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (“Traffic safety and aesthetics are significant inter-
ests, but they are not compelling interests, especially given the nature of the First Amendment rights 
at stake.”) (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507–08 (1981)); Loftus v. 
Twp. of Lawrence Park, 764 F. Supp. 354, 361 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (“[W]e doubt that aesthetics or resi-
dential quietude is sufficiently compelling to ever justify a content-based restriction . . . on freedom of 
expression.”). 
 22 Of the current members of the U.S. Supreme Court, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen 
Breyer, and Elena Kagan support a continued distinction in First Amendment law between commer-
cial and noncommercial speech. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 583 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (In his dissent, which Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined, Justice Breyer argued: “We 
have always been careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First Amendment’s 
core.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 
(1995))); see also id. at 588 (“[N]either of these categories—‘content-based’ nor ‘speaker-based’—
has ever before justified greater scrutiny when regulatory activity affects commercial speech.”); Vic-
tor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153, 1154–55 (2012) 
(noting that the Supreme Court has not clearly expressed how the First Amendment affects commer-
cial speech). Justice Anthony Kennedy has consistently joined opinions applying the test for commer-
cial speech in Central Hudson & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, decided in 1980 by the 
Court. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 485 (1996); City of Cincinnati v. Dis-
covery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 (1993). He also applied Central Hudson himself while writ-
ing the majority opinion in Sorrell, which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and 
Sonia Sotomayor joined without writing separately. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 583–86. To be sure, as Justice 
Breyer noted in his Reed concurrence, to refer to the commercial speech doctrine only to find that it 
did not apply to the commercial speech at issue in the present case, as the Court did in Sorrell, should 
hardly be characterized as a full-throated endorsement of the doctrine. Only Justice Clarence Thomas 
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considering challenges to cities’ regulation of business signage post-Reed have 
taken note of the fact that Reed left undisturbed the four-part intermediate 
scrutiny test for commercial speech that the Court adopted in 1980’s Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.23 For example, 
both the Central and Northern Districts of California have found that Reed did 
not prohibit cities from banning offsite commercial billboards on the ground 
that those prohibitions were governed by Central Hudson intermediate scruti-
ny, not the Reed Two-Step.24 The Northern District of Illinois came to the same 
conclusion with respect to square footage and numerical restrictions on com-
mercial signs.25 Accordingly, the notion that Reed-style strict scrutiny will em-
power businesses to cram billboards and signs into thousands of powerless 
cities’ parks, playgrounds, and scenic vistas, turning every public space and 
roadway in the United States into the equivalent of the iconic scene from the 
film Blade Runner with the skies “lit by giant corporate logos and video bill-
boards hyping exotic getaways on other planets,”26 is—not to put too fine a 
point on it—farcical. 
To be sure, a minority of billboards or other signs now subject to the Reed 
Two-Step might not contain commercial messages. Current commercial speech 
doctrine, however, is well equipped to decide whether a particular sign’s mes-
sage is commercial in nature or not.27 Therefore, because the commercial 
                                                                                                                           
has consistently argued that the Court should abandon the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 23 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–66 (1980). 
 24 Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. Cty. of Alameda, 114 F. Supp. 3d 952, 969, 973 (N.D. Cal. 
2015); Cal. Outdoor Equity Partners v. City of Corona, No. CV 15-03172, 2015 WL 4163346, at *10 
(C.D. Cal. July 9, 2015) (“Reed does not concern commercial speech, let alone bans on off-site bill-
boards. . . . Reed does not even cite Central Hudson, let alone apply it.”); see also Boelter v. Hearst 
Commc’ns, Inc., 15-Civ 3934 (AT), 15 Civ. 9279 (AT), 2016 WL 3369541, at *9–10, *9 n.10 
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2016) (noting that Reed “has not explicitly overturned the decades of jurispru-
dence holding that commercial speech . . . which, inherently, requires a content-based distinction—
warrants less First Amendment protection”); Contest Promotions, LLC v. City & Cty. of S.F., No. 15-
cv-00093-SI, 2015 WL 4571564, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2015) (“Reed does not concern commercial 
speech, and therefore does not disturb the framework which holds that commercial speech is subject 
only to intermediate scrutiny as defined by the Central Hudson test.”). 
 25 Peterson v. Village of Downers Grove, 150 F. Supp. 3d 910, 927–28 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (stating 
that because “the majority never specifically addressed commercial speech in Reed, . . . lower courts 
must consider Central Hudson and its progeny . . . binding”). Courts have found Reed inapplicable to 
commercial speech in non-signage cases as well. See Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Sch. v. Healey, 
159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 192–93 (D. Mass. 2016) (discussing regulations applicable to representations by 
for-profit schools to prospective students that implicated commercial speech). 
 26 See Fred Kaplan, A Cult Classic Restored, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/09/30/movies/30kapl.html [https://perma.cc/N65T-2QU6]; BLADE RUNNER (Warner 
Bros. Pictures 1982). 
 27 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65–67 (1983) (setting out factors that 
include advertising format, product references, and economic motivation to determine whether certain 
statements are commercial speech); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) 
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speech doctrine seems to have continued vitality, it is also premature to con-
clude that a signage regulation that distinguishes between commercial and 
noncommercial signs and establishes different requirements for each kind of 
sign is necessarily itself content-based and thus doomed to strict scrutiny under 
Reed. 
The Court’s decision in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. in 
1993 is not to the contrary.28 Applying Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny, 
the Court held that Cincinnati’s ban on what it defined as “commercial news-
racks” did not bear a reasonable fit to its asserted interest in preserving the aes-
thetics of its sidewalks.29 In concluding that the ban on commercial news-
racks—i.e., newsracks containing advertising-based publications such as Auto 
Trader, rather than traditional newspapers—were not reasonably tailored to the 
city’s interest, the Court considered that newspaper-dispensing newsracks, of 
which there were many more in number, were freely allowed.30 To be sure, the 
Court did go on to conclude that the Cincinnati sign ordinance’s distinction 
between “commercial newsracks” and those dispensing newspapers was con-
tent-based.31 Because the Court had already held that the regulation was an 
impermissible restriction on commercial speech, however, its content-
discrimination analysis was at best, as the dissenters noted, “duplicative”32 
and, at worst, irrelevant. Nor did the Discovery Network majority go on to ac-
tually apply strict scrutiny once it found the ordinance’s distinction rendered it 
content-based. It was Central Hudson, not strict scrutiny, that did all of the 
analytical work in Discovery Network.33 Lower courts that rely on Discovery 
Network to apply strict scrutiny to sign regulations distinguishing between 
commercial and noncommercial signs are guilty of a sin similar to the one de-
scribed in Reed itself and discussed in greater detail in Part II.34 
                                                                                                                           
(stating that speech on public issues is “indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this is 
no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual”) (footnote omit-
ted); cf. Keene Corp. v. Abate, 608 A.2d 811, 814 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (holding that a corpora-
tion advertising its views regarding the societal impact of asbestos litigation during an ongoing asbes-
tos case involving the corporation was fully protected by the First Amendment). 
 28 See Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 425–26. 
 29 Id. at 426–28. 
 30 Id. at 426. 
 31 Id. at 429. 
 32 Id. at 445 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 33 If commercial billboards might create a greater nuisance in a particular jurisdiction than non-
commercial ones because there are many more of the former, that fact alone could be enough to dis-
tinguish the ordinance at issue in Discovery Network. See, e.g., RTM Media, L.L.C. v. City of Hou-
ston, 584 F.3d 220, 227 (5th Cir. 2009). Additionally, distinctions between different types of commer-
cial signs—for example, onsite as opposed to offsite—would be subjected to mere Central Hudson 
intermediate scrutiny as well. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507–08 
(1981). 
  34 See supra notes 112–122 and accompanying text. 
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It must be conceded that claiming the commercial speech doctrine will 
remain a meaningful limitation on Reed is as much a legal realist argument as a 
doctrinal one. Democratic appointees to the lower federal courts are more in-
clined to apply a robust version of commercial speech doctrine than those 
judges appointed by Republican presidents, and, because President Barack 
Obama has made those appointments over the past eight years, Reed’s reach 
will be limited. On the other hand, now that it is a Republican president’s turn 
to stock federal court vacancies, Reed’s Two-Step could become the very 
weapon used to blow the commercial speech doctrine away altogether.35 On 
the question of Reed’s eventual direction, therefore, the metaphorical jury may 
still be out. It is certainly so at present, however, that current First Amendment 
doctrine—not simply the commercial speech doctrine but also the traditional 
low-value categories of speech derived from the Court’s 1942 decision in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that have long been thought to rest outside of 
the First Amendment’s protection, despite being content-based36—calls for a 
prediction that despite the case’s potentiality, Reed’s reach will actually be 
more limited than its critics maintain. In other words, the limiting principle for 
Reed’s effect on First Amendment doctrine will be First Amendment doctrine 
itself. That is certainly tautological, but if the Court plans to use Reed as a 
scythe to cut through wide swaths of existing First Amendment law, then we 
should not underestimate the monumental nature of that task.37 
In 2010, in United States v. Stevens, the Court noted that the Chaplinsky 
categories of speech that were deemed “outside the scope of the First Amend-
ment” were long established and historical, such that the Court could not add 
other categories to that list through an “ad hoc calculus of [the] costs and bene-
fits” of that speech.38 That rule of “historical[] unprotect[ion],” to fashion a 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 179–80 (“Commercial speech 
advocates have . . . argued that because commercial speech regulation necessarily targets speech be-
cause of the topic discussed, namely its commercial content, Reed requires strict scrutiny of all com-
mercial speech.”). 
 36 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (discussing categories of speech of 
fighting words, obscenity, and libel). 
 37 Or, in the words of two of Reed’s most trenchant critics: 
First Amendment doctrine is plural. There is no single structure of First Amendment 
doctrine. . . . Different kinds of speech embody different constitutional values, and each 
kind of speech should receive constitutional protections appropriate to the value it em-
bodies. . . . [S]ubject[ing] all speech to a single set of rules can lead only to doctrinal 
chaos.  
Amanda Shanor & Robert Post, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 181–82 
(2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/adam-smiths-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/BTZ9-
4MXT]. 
 38 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2010). 
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term from the Court’s test in Stevens, cuts both ways.39 The same long-
standing history and tradition that counsels the Court against finding new con-
tent-based categories as being outside of the First Amendment also prevents the 
Court from assessing whether the lack of protection for those existing categories 
should be reconsidered. The wall around the Chaplinsky categories keeps new 
categories of speech out, but it also keeps the existing categories in.40 
Finally, and to return the focus to signs, in a development that even Reed 
skeptics should welcome, Reed seems to be spurring municipalities to remove 
references to content in their own sign ordinances—hence significantly reduc-
ing the likelihood that municipalities might regulate signage or abuse their 
signing codes to favor or disfavor certain messages. For example, for several 
years, Norfolk, Virginia had a sign code that exempted from its restrictions 
governmental flags, noncommercial “works of art,” and the signs of any “reli-
gious organization.”41 While that sign code was in place, Norfolk decided to 
initiate condemnation proceedings against several landowners, intending to 
take the property and transfer it to Old Dominion University (“ODU”).42 One 
of the landowners placed a 375-square-foot, highway-facing banner on one of 
the condemned buildings, arguing that Norfolk was abusing its eminent do-
main power by initiating the condemnation proceedings.43 After an ODU em-
ployee complained about the banner, the city found that the banner violated the 
size restrictions in the sign code.44 Norfolk’s actions were affirmed by the dis-
trict court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.45 Upon the 
Supreme Court’s vacatur of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in light of Reed, 
however, Norfolk amended its code to comply with Reed’s rule rather than de-
fend it in court under that standard.46 If more cities follow Norfolk’s lead in 
removing content references from their sign codes—and indeed there is al-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See id. at 472. 
 40 For persuasive arguments that the wall around the Chaplinsky categories is not impenetrable (if 
it exists at all) and indeed that the categories themselves are the product of the very type of cost-
benefit balancing that the Court rejected in Stevens, see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balanc-
ing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 387–98 (2009) and Alexander 
Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 EMORY L.J. 495, 505–17 
(2015). 
 41 Cent. Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, 776 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2893 
(2015) (mem.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42 Id. at 233. 
 43 Id. at 233–34. 
 44 Id. at 234. 
 45 Id. at 234, 241. 
 46 Cent. Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 2016). 
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ready evidence that this is the case47—then there will be many fewer content-
referencing signage regulations for speakers to challenge. This would ensure 
that the Supreme Court will not find itself becoming, to use Justice Kagan’s 
phrase, a “veritable Supreme Board of Sign Review,”48 and permitting the 
Court to focus on controversies that Justice Kagan apparently deems more 
worthy of its time. 
B. Panhandling 
Another category of First Amendment cases in which Reed has become 
highly relevant is legal challenges to municipal bans or restrictions on panhan-
dling. Though courts considering panhandling bans have never held that pan-
handling is not speech,49 pre-Reed, a few of those bans survived constitutional 
challenges on the ground that the relevant municipalities did not promulgate 
the bans because of disagreement with the messages that panhandlers ex-
press.50 After its decision in Reed, however, the Court vacated and remanded 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s decision to uphold such a ban 
on those grounds,51 and on a motion for post-Reed rehearing, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed its own decision to uphold a panhan-
dling ban in Springfield, Illinois.52 
A finding that anti-panhandling ordinances are content-based—as three of 
the courts of appeals have previously held and as more lower courts are likely 
to hold post-Reed—seems like a straightforward application of content dis-
crimination doctrine.53 This is especially so with respect to laws that use con-
tent-related categories to treat solicitations differently based on their particular 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See Geft Outdoor LLC v. Consol. City of Indianapolis & Cty. of Marion, 1:15-cv-01568-SEB-
MJD, 2016 WL 2941329, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 20, 2016) (stating that Indianapolis amended its sign 
ordinance “to reflect the Supreme Court’s holding in Reed”). 
 48 Reed III, 135 S. Ct. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 49 See, e.g., Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 
944–45 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 50 See, e.g., Doucette v. City of Santa Monica, 955 F. Supp. 1192, 1204–05 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 51 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60, 75 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) 
(mem.). 
 52 Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 53 See Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 560 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated by 
Cent. Radio, 811 F.3d 625; Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 870 (6th Cir. 2013); Am. Civil Liberties 
Union of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 796 (9th Cir. 2006). One circuit court has held to 
the contrary, in a decision that is now over twenty years old. ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 
61 F.3d 949, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1995). District courts have also been arriving at the same conclusion post-
Reed. See, e.g., Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1289–90 (D. Colo. 2015) 
(observing that any law prohibiting all solicitation speech in a public forum constitutes content dis-
crimination under Reed); McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185–86, 185 n.3 (D. 
Mass. 2015) (“It appears at this point clear that regulations of solicitation which single out the solicita-
tion of the immediate transfer of funds for charitable purposes are content-based.”). 
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purpose, such as charitable donations.54 Again, this should not doom any such 
effort to automatic failure. To the extent that cities have identified panhandling 
as a serious issue requiring a legislative remedy, compelling non-speech-
related interests such as pedestrian safety (as opposed to the above-referenced 
traffic safety interest invoked by governments to support signage restrictions) 
could be offered in support of such bans.55 Under strict scrutiny, the real ques-
tion would be how much evidence the government must provide in support of 
the compellingness of that interest. In the case of bans in high-traffic areas like 
road median strips, one accident involving a panhandler in the city or a similar 
area would likely suffice.56 Alternatively, if the interest supporting a ban is to 
protect pedestrians from the intimidation and discomfort caused by aggressive 
begging, narrow tailoring would require a city to limit its restrictions to solici-
tations of that type. Forcing governments to narrow a statute’s reach to only 
that kind of speech-related conduct that infringes on the asserted interest at 
issue is exactly what the First Amendment is meant to do. 
For example, in the aforementioned First Circuit decision to uphold a ban 
that was vacated by the Supreme Court, the ban proscribed only “aggressive” 
begging or panhandling; it even went so far as to define “aggressive” solicita-
tion as “continuing to . . . solicit from a person after the person has given a 
negative response” or a solicitation that blocked “the safe or free passage of a 
[person]” or was “likely to cause a reasonable person to fear imminent bodily 
harm.”57 A statute’s distinction between “aggressive” solicitation and nonag-
gressive solicitation arguably does not implicate Reed at all, provided the defi-
nition of “aggressive” is conduct-based rather than speech-based—and even if 
the statute might use the content of a panhandler’s speech to define “aggres-
sive,” the public safety of solicited people is just as compelling an interest as 
the public safety of their solicitors.58 Again, as shown already with respect to 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016) (finding unconstitu-
tional under Reed a law that barred solicitation with the purpose of “obtaining ‘money or goods as a 
charity’”). 
 55 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. By contrast, courts have rejected other interests 
asserted in support of panhandling bans, such as the promotion of tourism, as insufficiently compel-
ling. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Idaho, Inc. v. City of Boise, 998 F. Supp. 2d 908, 917 (D. 
Idaho 2014); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1581 (S.D. Fla. 1992). 
 56 Unfortunately, even in Worcester itself, such incidents are not at all rare. See Brad Petrishen, 
Known Panhandler in Critical Condition After Being Hit by SUV, TELEGRAM.COM (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.telegram.com/article/20150226/NEWS/302269663 [https://perma.cc/3KU8-U6BV]. 
 57 WORCESTER, MASS., REV. ORDINANCES ch. 9, § 16 (2016); Thayer, 755 F.3d at 64; see also 
Norton, 768 F.3d at 720 (Manion, J., dissenting) (discussing Thayer). 
 58 Cf. McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 186, 191 (finding that a panhandling statute that distin-
guished between “immediate” solicitations from other kinds was content-based and implicated Reed, 
and further finding that the “aggressive panhandling” provisions of a statute infringed on speech and 
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signage restrictions, and later in this Article with respect to consumer-
protective regulation, the Reed Two-Step will cause municipalities seeking to 
proscribe panhandling to point to identifiable harms and pass narrow laws 
when infringing on protected speech. 
Indeed, one of the post-Reed cases in another area demonstrates how 
strict scrutiny imposes this type of regulatory discipline upon governments 
using content-based laws. In 2015, in Cahaly v. Larosa,59 the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, applying Reed, held that a South Carolina anti-robocall stat-
ute that barred automated telephone calls relating to consumer solicitations or 
political campaigns was content-based. After so finding, the court found that 
given the State’s asserted interest in “protect[ing] residential privacy and tran-
quility from unwanted and intrusive robocalls,” less speech-restrictive 
measures, such as “time-of-day limitations, mandatory disclosure of the call-
er’s identity, or do-not-call lists” were more narrowly tailored to that interest 
than an outright ban.60 So too with panhandling bans—if the problem a munic-
ipality seeks to correct is to keep panhandlers off of median strips in high-
traffic areas, or pedestrian intimidation along boardwalks or promenades, only 
panhandling with the potential to adversely affect those specifically identified 
interests should be circumscribed. It does the government no great harm to 
force it to begin the lawmaking process with consideration of less restrictive 
alternatives instead of blanket bans on speech. 
C. Intellectual Property 
Section 2 of the Lanham Act bars the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) from registering certain trademarks because of their content.61 Indeed, 
one would be hard-pressed to find any federal statute that makes more refer-
ences to content than the Lanham Act.62 Some of these references, in particular 
those precluding the PTO from registering marks likely “to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive,” or that are “deceptively misdescriptive,” have 
already been held to not violate the First Amendment because of their compli-
ance with the traditional rule that a government can punish speech that is 
                                                                                                                           
were content-based but were supported by the compelling interest of protecting individuals from pan-
handlers’ aggressive behavior). 
 59 Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 402 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 60 Id. at 405. 
 61 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
 62 See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Registration 
and Free Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 382 (2017) (“Section 2 is almost nothing but content-
based.”). See generally Ned Snow, Free Speech & Disparaging Trademarks, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1639 
(2016) (discussing the relationship between the First Amendment and the content-based restrictions in 
the Lanham Act).  
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fraudulent or likely to cause consumer confusion.63 Reed should not challenge 
these conclusions; as discussed in this Part, courts have consistently found 
consumer protection to be a compelling interest.64 Other parts of Section 2 of 
the Lanham Act, however, may be at much greater risk, especially post-Reed. 
Most directly in the line of fire is Section 2(a)’s bar on registering marks be-
cause of their scandalous, immoral, or disparaging nature. 
In 2015, in In re Tam, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
sitting en banc, held that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act facially violated the 
First Amendment.65 The court first found that per Reed, Section 2(a) denies 
registration of a mark because the content of that mark is disparaging, and that 
the PTO’s test for disparagement focuses on the message that the mark at issue 
conveys; each of those conclusions make Section 2(a) content-based, and the 
court therefore held that strict scrutiny was appropriate.66 The court went on to 
find that Section 2(a) also discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, because the 
denial of a mark on disparagement grounds constitutes “disagreement with the 
message . . . convey[ed].”67 Pouncing on the government’s argument that it 
should not be compelled to give its imprimatur to “vile racial epithets and im-
ages” it finds “odious” by registering them, the court declared that Section 2(a) 
burdens speech based on the government’s disapproval of that speech’s mes-
sage.68 
Putting aside the Federal Circuit’s Tam majority’s curious rejection of 
trademarks as commercial speech,69 the Tam approach to First Amendment ques-
                                                                                                                           
 63 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (d)–(e); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13, 19 (1979) (explaining that be-
cause an optometry practice can deceive the public by use of a trade name, a law prohibiting optome-
try practices from their use does not violate the First Amendment); see also Tushnet, supra note 62, at 
407 (“Since false and misleading commercial speech can just be banned, there’s little doubt that the 
government can take the lesser action of refusing to support it” by refusing to register it as a trade-
mark.). 
 64 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–64 (1995) (stating that be-
cause customers may identify a particular color as associated with a brand, that color can be trade-
marked). 
 65 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom., Lee v. Tam, 137 
S. Ct. 30 (2016) (mem.). But see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 
2015). 
 66 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1335. 
 67 Id. at 1335–36 (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566). 
 68 Id. at 1336–37 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69 In brief, the In re Tam majority argued that the PTO’s refusal to register the mark at issue on 
disparagement grounds meant that the mark was being regulated based on its expressiveness, not its 
commercial function, and that the mark was thus not commercial speech. Id. at 1337–38. Of course, 
and as the majority acknowledged, if this were so, it would also be true of every PTO application of 
Section 2(a) to a mark. Such a broad conclusion would be flatly contrary to both the history of the 
Lanham Act and the hundreds of federal court cases applying it. See, e.g., Friedman, 440 U.S. at 11 
(stating that trademarks are “a form of commercial speech and nothing more”); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. 
Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 2000) (“The basic objectives of trademark law are to encour-
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tions in intellectual property, informed in part by Reed, is surely problematic. 
Protectability in intellectual property is necessarily content-based, in not just 
trademark but in copyright as well. Applying the Reed Two-Step in these cases 
would therefore lead ineluctably to strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, there is a defen-
sible way to avoid Reed—and indeed the First Amendment altogether—in the 
trademark context. It is possible to save Section 2(a) from constitutional scrutiny 
by distinguishing a bar on the PTO’s registering of a mark from a content-based 
ban on speech. In other words, even though the object of registration is expres-
sion, the right to registration is a government benefit.70 Following that distinc-
tion, the government’s decision whether to grant such a benefit exists independ-
ent of, and thus does not implicate, the speaker’s right to that expression. When 
the PTO denies registration of a trademark, the government in effect is making a 
decision to not support that speech71; choosing not to subsidize speech because 
of its content is distinguishable from punishing it or restraining it ex ante be-
cause of its content, which are the First Amendment’s true concerns. 
Even under the most robust reading of Reed, the government’s failure to 
grant a speaker a monopoly on his or her speech, or otherwise declining to fa-
cilitate the speaker’s monetization or amplification of that speech, is not the 
same as direct suppression of that speech. The government cannot turn any 
speaker off because of what they say, but it also does not have to turn every 
                                                                                                                           
age product differentiation, promote the production of quality goods, and provide consumers with 
information about the quality of goods”—i.e., commercial in nature.); see also In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 
1378 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (“The nature of trademarks seeking federal registration for use in inter-
state commerce, when considered as a whole, is indisputably commercial . . . .”). It cannot be so that 
the government’s purpose for regulating the speech at issue can transform that speech from commer-
cial to noncommercial. 
 It is surely the case that some marks and alleged infringements of those marks touch on speech 
involving social or political issues. See, e.g., In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1373–74 (Dyk, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (noting that the disparagement bar was constitutional on its face, but un-
constitutional as applied to the applicant at issue, because his “choice of mark reflect[ed] a clear desire 
to editorialize on cultural and political subjects”). The overwhelming majority of marks, however, 
including those potentially subject to the disparagement bar, are connected to nothing more than the 
“sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising” of a good or service. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). 
Accordingly, the commercial speech issue would not be a close question in the overwhelming majori-
ty of cases. 
 70 The fact that the PTO’s declining or revoking the registration of a mark does not have any 
effect on the mark’s use outside of the registration process also shows the likely inapplicability of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. As the Court has made clear in its most recent elucidation of the 
doctrine, it only applies if the government’s conditions on a benefit would adversely affect a party’s 
speech outside of the program administering the benefit. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open 
Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2013). Here, as noted, nothing bars a speaker from using a 
mark that disparages or offends outside of the PTO’s registration system altogether. Id. at 2330. 
 71 Tushnet, supra note 62, at 386. 
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speaker up regardless of what they say.72 If the Federal Circuit in Tam’s view 
of the First Amendment holds,73 then the federal government may well be out 
of the business of not just registering trademarks and copyrights, but also 
granting radio and television station licenses,74 tax exemptions to nonprofits,75 
and federal funds used to advocate certain policy initiatives but not others76—
all of which have been found to raise no constitutional issue. Accordingly, one 
way to ensure that the Reed Two-Step will not pulverize intellectual property 
law is to affirm that the First Amendment, and thus Reed, does not apply to 
federal trademark registration at all.77 Considering that the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to Tam in September 2016, the issue may be settled one way 
or the other soon.78 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 355, 358 (2009). The Court in 2009 in 
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association stated that the First Amendment does not “confer an af-
firmative right to use government . . . mechanisms for the purpose of . . . expression,” nor does it re-
quire the government to “assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas.” Id. The Federal 
Circuit in In re Tam cited this passage from Ysursa. In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1368 (Dyk, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). In addition, in In re Tam, Judge Alan David Lourie, dissenting, stated: 
[T]he refusal of the USPTO to register a trademark is not a denial of an applicant’s 
right of free speech. The markholder may still generally use the mark as it wishes; 
without federal registration, it simply lacks access to certain federal statutory enforce-
ment mechanisms for excluding others from confusingly similar uses of the mark. 
Id. at 1374–75 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
  73 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to In re Tam on September 29, 2016 to address the ques-
tion of whether or not the provision of the Lanham Act that bars the PTO from registering disparaging 
marks is facially unconstitutional. Lee, 137 S. Ct. 30. 
 74 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1969) (stating that the government 
can constitutionally license broadcasters); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 622 
(1994) (stating that the must-carry statute that mandated cable carriage of certain kinds of content is 
constitutional). 
 75 See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983). 
 76 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177, 203 (1991). Nor could a government reject a third 
parties’ proposed advertising for its public transportation system. See Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion); Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 
65, 91–93 (1st Cir. 2004); Uptown Pawn & Jewelry, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 337 F.3d 1275, 1281 
(11th Cir. 2003). A government also could not exclude certain candidates from debates on its televi-
sion stations. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998). 
 77 Despite its references to content, a Reed-driven upending of copyright law seems even less 
likely than an upending of trademark law. Courts “routinely refuse to conduct First Amendment re-
view in copyright cases.” Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 
95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 479–81 (2010) (arguing that copyright law is a de facto categorical excep-
tion that is as immune from First Amendment scrutiny as other categorical exceptions including true 
threats, fighting words, or obscenity). 
  78 See Lee, 137 S. Ct. 30. 
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D. Consumer Protection-Related Regulations Referencing Content 
Of course, the observers most concerned with Reed’s reach are not con-
cerned primarily with municipalities’ ability to regulate signage or panhan-
dling, or even the federal government’s trademark registration system. In his 
concurrence in the Reed judgment, Justice Breyer argued that a strict adher-
ence to the majority’s distinction between content-based and content-neutral 
laws would put at risk a range of government regulation of speech in areas his-
torically deemed permissible—even noncontroversial; these areas include se-
curities regulation, prescription drug labeling, and doctor-patient confidentiali-
ty.79 Similarly, critics argue that the decision “endangered” laws regulating 
“misleading advertising and professional malpractice,” and the case “re-
quir[ed] a second look at the constitutionality of aspects of federal and state 
securities laws, the federal Communications Act and many others.”80 
Justice Breyer’s and others’ concerns sound in a growing body of aca-
demic critique becoming known as First Amendment Lochnerism—a phrase 
first coined, some might find ironically enough, by Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist81—which argues that the Roberts Court and some lower courts are 
using First Amendment claims brought by business petitioners to apply height-
ened standards of review to consumer-protective regulations in those areas 
mentioned by Justice Breyer and other critics82 as well as other areas, such as 
online privacy83 and corporate campaign spending.84 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Reed III, 135 S. Ct. at 2234–35 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012) (registra-
tion statement disclosure requirements); 42 U.S.C. § 6294 (2012) (consumer product labeling re-
quirements); 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(4)(A) (2012) (prescription drug labeling requirements); 38 U.S.C. 
§ 7332 (2012) (medical record confidentiality requirements); 26 U.S.C. § 6039F (2012) (foreign gift 
tax requirements); 14 C.F.R. § 136.7 (2015) (briefing of airplane passengers requirements)). 
 80 Liptak, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting constitutional lawyer Floyd 
Abrams). 
 81 See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 591 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“[B]y labeling economic regu-
lation of business conduct as a restraint on ‘free speech,’ [the Court has] gone far to resurrect the dis-
credited doctrine of cases such as Lochner . . . .”). 
 82 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1119, 1131–
32 (2015) (noting that “cases raising First Amendment challenges” cover regulations on “food and 
drug labeling requirements, disclosure requirements for securities issuers, [and] permissible uses of 
consumer information”); Ronald A. Fein, Symposium Foreword, Money, Politics, Corporation and 
the Constitution, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 213, 216–17 (2015); Kenneth D. Katkin, First Amendment 
Lochnerism? Emerging Constitutional Limitations on Government Regulation of Non-Speech Eco-
nomic Activity, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 365, 369–71 (2006); Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Com-
mercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2587 n.16 (2008); Tamara R. Piety, The First 
Amendment and the Corporate Civil Rights Movement, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 1 (2016); Jedediah 
Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
195, 203 n.41 (2015); Shanor & Post, supra note 35, at 179–80. Some commentators place the begin-
nings of the rise of a corporate First Amendment at an earlier point in the Court’s history—in particu-
lar, when Justice Lewis Powell joined the Court in the mid-1970s. See John C. Coates IV, Corporate 
Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 250–51, 
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Whether the First Amendment can, does, or should distinguish between 
individual and corporate speech; whether the current Court has given the First 
Amendment a corporatist cast that diverges from prior cases; whether that di-
vergence moves in a direction that is good or bad for the freedom of speech—
these are all debates well worth having. Reed, however, does not affect those 
debates in any meaningful way. A close look at a few of the areas of govern-
ment regulation purported to be threatened by Reed’s holding shows that Reed 
has not doomed every consumer welfare-related regulation affecting speech to 
judicial invalidation. Even post-Reed, it remains so that—as the Court has con-
sistently affirmed—the government can still regulate, and even proscribe, 
harmful commercial activity that involves speech.85 
As an initial matter, one should read Reed not for what it portends but ra-
ther for what it actually does: it places the burden of justification for any regu-
lation referencing content on the government.86 This is a straightforward and 
well established proposition.87 In the face of claims that Reed will serve as a 
new and nefarious tool in the Court’s First Amendment Lochnerism project, 
however, it bears reemphasis: if a government references content in its laws, it 
must demonstrate that they survive strict scrutiny. So, the question is how “fa-
tal” strict scrutiny in particular cases involving facially content-based laws ac-
tually turns out to be.88 Ironically enough, those areas that present the most 
                                                                                                                           
262 (2015); Joe Pinsker, How Corporations Took Over the First Amendment, ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporations-took-over-the-first-
amendment/389249/ [https://perma.cc/TH9C-MQCR]. Even those commentators argue, however, that 
the shift from cases involving individual speakers to businesses is accelerating under the current 
Court. See Coates, supra, at 263 (discussing corporate personhood under the Court’s Citizens United 
and Hobby Lobby cases). A small number of free speech scholars, however, have rebutted this line of 
critique. See Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 7–8), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2741139 [https://perma.cc/EP2Q-9P8S]. 
 83 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1508 (2013). 
 84 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); Speech-
NOW.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686, 692–93 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 85 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). 
 86 As the Court said itself in Reed, “it is the Town’s burden to demonstrate that the [Sign] Code’s 
differentiation between temporary directional signs and other types of signs, such as political signs 
and ideological signs, furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that 
end.” Reed III, 135 S. Ct. at 2231.  
 87 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (“[T]he State 
bears the burden of justifying its [commercial speech] restrictions.”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
406–07 (1989) (“It is . . . the governmental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a re-
striction on . . . expression is valid.”). 
 88 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). Of course, the 
“strict in theory, but fatal in fact” convention has been proven wrong time and time again, both in the 
First Amendment context and in other constitutional areas. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 
S. Ct. 1656, 1665–66 (2015); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003). 
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concern with respect to limiting governmental authority are the same areas in 
which regulations are most likely to survive First Amendment review. This is 
so because of the compellingness of the government’s interest in protecting 
consumers in those areas as well as the corresponding ease with which the 
government will be able to demonstrate that compellingness in future cases. 
For example, take compelled disclosures in securities law.89 Is there actu-
ally anything to fear here? Even if the Court were to eventually read the Reed 
Two-Step to overtake not just the commercial speech doctrine generally, but 
the compelled commercial speech doctrine—an overtaking that is not obvious-
ly likely, as discussed in this Article90—securities-related disclosures imposed 
on stock offerors by the Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulations 
would not immediately fall to strict scrutiny review because providing timely, 
accurate, and material information to market participants is unquestionably a 
compelling governmental interest.91 In the absence of disclosure requirements, 
investors, shareholders, and consumers will be deprived of material infor-
mation concerning companies listing a security for sale that is not reflected in 
that security’s price alone—deprivations that could lead directly to economic 
losses. The interest here is in permitting the investor, rather than the listing com-
pany, to decide which information is material to the decision of whether to in-
vest. This interest is certainly a compelling one deserving of government protec-
tion; hundreds of years of common law fraud is based on the same principle.92 
So too with country-of-origin labeling mandates imposed by Congress in 
a range of areas and, in the case of food labeling, the U.S. Department of Agri-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Compelled disclosures in securities law is one of the traditional areas of regulatory concern that 
Adam Liptak, the Supreme Court correspondent to the New York Times, suggested may be at risk after 
Reed. Liptak, supra note 8. 
 90 See supra notes 20–27 and accompanying text. 
 91 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that even where 
commercial speech doctrine does not apply, disclosure mandates of “purely factual and uncontrover-
sial information” aimed at preventing consumer deception do not violate First Amendment); see also 
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 652 
(1990). 
 92 See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining the Securities and Ex-
change Commission’s Rule 14a-9’s use of “material,” stating that “an omitted fact is material if there 
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how 
to vote”); Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 233 F.3d 981, 992 
(7th Cir. 2000) (“The government is not limited only to explicit antifraud measures to prevent its citi-
zens from being defrauded; certain other narrowly tailored measures with a direct relationship to pre-
venting fraud may be used as well.”). Of course, a general desire for “consumer protection” is stated 
too vaguely to be deemed a compelling interest. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 
(2d Cir. 1996) (noting that “consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough state interest,” and further 
noting that “[w]ere consumer interest alone sufficient, there is no end to the information that states 
could require manufacturers to disclose about their production methods”). Here, as discussed infra 
with respect to narrow tailoring, a higher level of scrutiny will require the government to articulate its 
interests in restricting content with a greater degree of specificity. 
84 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:65 
culture. There, to take just one example, the interests in informing consumers 
of information relating to potential food-borne illness outbreaks in other coun-
tries or regions would be found compelling as well.93 To lift a phrase Justice 
Antonin Scalia used in a different context, it is exceedingly unlikely that Reed 
will “almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed” from unknowingly 
eating unlabeled beef made from English and Canadian mad cows.94 
Of course, the government must also show that such regulations are also 
narrowly tailored in order to survive strict scrutiny’s other prong; this is the 
real concern of Reed’s critics. As this Article has argued, however, the narrow 
tailoring requirement will impose a discipline upon the government when it is 
regulating speech based on its content, and First Amendment advocates should 
welcome that. In the case of securities and labeling laws, regulators will have 
to be mindful that only information the nondisclosure of which will likely 
cause specifically articulated harms to potential investors or consumers will be 
subject to disclosure requirements—and they will have to generate detailed, 
specific findings demonstrating the link between its mandates and the harms 
those mandates are intended to prevent.95 Any compelled disclosures that are 
not so related would cause regulations premised upon fraud protection, health 
and safety, or truth-in-marketing to be overinclusive and place the constitu-
tionality of those regulations at risk.96 
In a First Amendment world where the presumption should rest on the side 
of the speaker, these are undoubtedly good things. A few of the cases applying 
Reed in other areas of the law demonstrate these principles in application. 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (charac-
terizing the interest at issue as a substantial one under the Court’s compelled commercial speech 
standard set forth in Zauderer). 
 94 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 828 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 95 This is not to say that Reed strict scrutiny for content-based regulations would require the gov-
ernment to wait until after such harms are suffered to take actions to prevent them. See Ibanez v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994) (holding that a regulator seeking to 
compel an advertiser’s use of a disclaimer must “point to any harm that is potentially real, not purely 
hypothetical”) (emphasis added). The burden is on the government, however, to show a link between 
the regulation and its asserted interest under not only strict scrutiny, but also under Central Hudson 
intermediate scrutiny as well. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 
1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d 18 (finding that the FDA did not pro-
vide substantial evidence linking its proposed graphic warning labels for cigarettes to its asserted 
interest in reducing smoking). 
 96 See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 26 (“[T]he disclosure mandated must relate to the good or 
service offered by the regulated party . . . .”). 
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E. Other Areas: Content Discrimination Doctrine and  
Criminal Law Post-Reed 
In 2016, in Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Attorney General, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit provided one example of what post-
Reed content discrimination doctrine might look like in the criminal law con-
text.97 Pursuant to enforcing the criminalization of child pornography, in 1988 
Congress imposed several recordkeeping requirements on the creators of “vis-
ual depictions” of “sexually explicit conduct” regarding the performers in 
those depictions.98 Those records had to list, among other things, each per-
former’s name, date of birth, and any stage names the performer had used as 
well as copies of the performer’s identification documents for verification pur-
poses.99 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had previously held that the 
requirements were content-neutral, on the ground that their references to sex-
ually explicit content were due not to “any disagreement with their underlying 
message but because doing so was the only pragmatic way to enforce [Con-
gress’s] ban on child pornography.”100 Intermediate scrutiny was thus the cor-
rect standard of review, and both the district court and Third Circuit held that 
that standard was met.101 
Post-Reed, however, the petitioners in Free Speech Coalition won recon-
sideration of that conclusion and persuaded the Third Circuit that the statute’s 
references to “visual depictions” of “sexually explicit conduct” made them 
content-based under Reed.102 The court then remanded to the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania so that it could apply strict scru-
tiny but noted that, in its own view, expressed in dicta in the prior case, the 
statute might not be able to meet that standard. Because the interest in prevent-
ing child pornography was presumed compelling by all parties,103 the issue 
was, and will be on remand, one of narrow tailoring. Though the Third Circuit 
left that issue to the lower court, it noted that the problem was likely that the 
statute swept too broadly in requiring age verification of every performer, no 
matter what the performer’s age, which was probably overinclusive with re-
                                                                                                                           
 97 See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. United States (Free Speech Coal. III), 825 F.3d 149, 
159–64 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 98 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a) (2012). 
 99 Id. at § 2257(b); 28 C.F.R. § 75.2(a)(1) (2015). 
 100 Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of the United States (Free Speech Coal. I), 677 F.3d 519, 
534 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).  
 101 Free Speech Coal. I, 677 F.3d at 524, 529.  
 102 Free Speech Coal. III, 825 F.3d at 160, 164 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2257). 
 103 Id. at 164 n.11. 
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spect to the asserted interest in protecting children from the harms associated 
with participating in the production of pornography.104 
Likewise, on the state court level, in 2016 in State v. Bishop, the North Car-
olina Supreme Court applied a similar analysis in finding that the state’s cyber-
bullying statute violated the First Amendment.105 There, the court found that, 
pursuant to Reed, the statute, which criminalized posting “private, personal or 
sexual information pertaining to a minor,” was content-based.106 It then found 
that the statute failed strict scrutiny because even though “protecting children 
from online bullying” was indisputably a compelling governmental interest, the 
statute was not narrowly tailored because its criminalizing of postings of person-
al information intended to “annoy” a minor swept far too broadly.107 
This is precisely the kind of judicial inquiry that First Amendment advo-
cates should cheer. Is the government’s interest in deterring child pornography 
or any pornography? If the former, then why does the statute cover any per-
former? The drafting history supporting the statute noted that despite the direct 
prohibitions on child pornography, “producers of sexually explicit materials 
continued to utilize youthful-looking performers.”108 So why does the statute, 
which requires the content producer to collect and keep the age of any per-
former as well as any prior stage names, compel more speech than is necessary 
given that expressed concern? So too with the North Carolina cyberbullying 
statute. It cannot be the case that the state has the power, consistent with the 
First Amendment, to protect people from “annoyance”—which seems an even 
less compelling basis for government intervention than offense, which the Su-
preme Court has rejected as illegitimate.109  
At their core, the tailoring and less-restrictive-means-related questions 
asked by the Third Circuit and the North Carolina Supreme Court in Free 
Speech Coalition and Bishop, respectively, are vagueness and overbreadth-
related questions that courts have long asked of criminal laws involving speech 
as well as conduct.110 Despite the protestations of Reed’s critics, the case has 
not altered the First Amendment calculus in a way that severely restricts gov-
ernments from passing such laws. It does ensure, however, that the govern-
ment’s power to criminalize speech should be earned, not assumed. 
                                                                                                                           
 104 Id. at 158 (quoting Free Speech Coal., Inc., v. Att’y Gen. United States, 787 F.3d 142, 156 (3d 
Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded on reh’g, 825 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2016)). 
 105 State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 822 (N.C. 2016). 
 106 Id. at 815 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–458.1(a)(1)(d) (2015)). 
 107 Id. at 818–22. 
 108 Free Speech Coal. III, 825 F.3d at 154 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 618 (1986)). 
 109 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997). 
 110 See, e.g., People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 487–88 (N.Y. 2014) (invalidating a cyberbul-
lying statute before Reed on the same rationale used by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Bishop). 
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In its Free Speech Coalition opinion, the Third Circuit noted that a re-
mand for the application of strict scrutiny would not necessarily “doom” the 
statutes; indeed, the Supreme Court had recently rejected a challenge to Flori-
da’s ban on judicial campaign solicitations, finding the regulation to be “one of 
the rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny.”111 Be-
cause it is assumed that the government interest at issue in Free Speech Coali-
tion is compelling, it is the lower courts’ role in such cases to ensure that the 
government’s powers are aimed at as little speech as possible to further that 
interest. That is what the First Amendment is all about—whether the affected 
speaker is a judge or a pornographer. 
II. THE REED TWO-STEP ANALYSIS: PROPERLY MINIMIZING THE  
ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL PURPOSE 
As shown in Part I, the claims that Reed will complete the transformation 
of the First Amendment from a shield to a sword have so far not been borne 
out by the lower courts applying the case nor by logically extending the case’s 
rule to different areas of law involving speech. It is certainly true that many—
if not most—of those courts that had previously considered “the government’s 
purpose . . . the controlling consideration” when analyzing whether a law was 
content-based have had to, and will have to, revise their analysis post-Reed.112 
Those courts, however, were applying a rule that the Supreme Court itself had 
never adopted. 
The content discrimination rule adopted in the courts of appeal, including 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Reed itself,113 prioritized gov-
ernmental purpose in the content neutrality inquiry—in particular, whether a 
law’s reference to content was based on discrimination against or disagreement 
with that content. Relying on the Court’s 1972 statement in Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosley that “above all else, the First Amendment means that gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
                                                                                                                           
 111 Free Speech Coal. III, 825 F.3d at 164 (citing Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 112 Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated by Cent. 
Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying “a pragmatic rather than formal-
istic approach to evaluating content neutrality” under which a regulation “is only content-based if it 
distinguishes content ‘with a censorial intent’”) (citation omitted). 
 113 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert (Reed II), 707 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding Gilbert’s 
sign ordinance was content-neutral because its references to different kinds of signs were not based on 
“illicit motive or bias” concerning those categories of content), rev’d and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 2218 
(2015); see also id. (“[D]istinctions based on the speaker or the event are permissible where there is 
no discrimination among similar events or speakers.”). 
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subject matter, or its content,”114 the lower courts had held that a regulation was 
content-based when its “underlying purpose [in referencing content] . . . is to 
suppress particular ideas or [to] single[] out particular content for differential 
treatment.”115 Academic commentaries, including Laurence Tribe’s massively 
influential constitutional law treatise, adopted this same purpose-focused ap-
proach to determining whether a law is content-based.116 
The Reed majority at the Supreme Court, however, firmly rejected this in-
terpretation of its content regulation cases. As noted above, the Court declared 
that a government’s motivation for passing a particular law—its mens rea, so 
to speak—is not relevant if a law refers to content on its face. In rejecting pre-
vious interpretations of purpose’s role in analyzing whether a law was content-
based, the Court noted that the idea that a benign purpose could save a facially 
content-based law from strict scrutiny came from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in 1989 in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, a case involving a facially 
content-neutral restriction—the only kinds of laws that, according to Reed, 
                                                                                                                           
 114 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). This language from Mosley has been 
quoted in all twelve federal courts of appeal, which has led those courts to consider whether a content-
based regulation had been adopted because of the government’s “disagreement with the message [that 
the content] conveys,” in lieu of a “formalistic approach to evaluating content neutrality that looks 
only to the terms of a regulation.” Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 366, 368 (4th Cir. 
2012); see, e.g., Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 675 F.3d 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 2012), opinion amended and 
superseded on denial of reh’g, 711 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 
2056 (2014); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 762 (8th Cir. 2005); Solantic, LLC v. 
City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005); Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Ector 
Cty. Hosp. Dist., 392 F.3d 733, 756 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 467 F.3d 427 (5th Cir. 
2006); Christ’s Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 255 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 677 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Auburn Police Un-
ion v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 898 (1st Cir. 1993); Cannon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 871 
(10th Cir. 1993); Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1178 (2d Cir. 1992); Knox Cty. Local, Nat’l 
Rural Letter Carriers’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Rural Letter Carriers’ Ass’n, 720 F.2d 936, 940 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir. 1978). Purpose-based analysis caused lower courts to, 
as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held pre-Reed, “not hesitate[] to deem a regulation 
content-neutral even if it facially differentiates between types of speech,” and to even consider pur-
pose before considering a statute’s text—in other words, the exact opposite of the Reed Two-Step. See 
Cozart, 680 F.3d at 366. 
 115 Reed v. Town of Gilbert (Reed I), 587 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Berger v. City of 
Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009)), overruled by 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015); see also Norton v. 
City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that content-based regulations are those 
which restrict speech either “because of the ideas it conveys” or “because the government disapproves 
of its message”), rev’d on reh’g, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 116 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that a law is 
content-based “if on its face a governmental action is targeted at ideas or information that government 
seeks to suppress, or if a governmental action neutral on its face was motivated by (i.e., would not 
have occurred but for) an intent to single out constitutionally protected speech for control or penalty”) 
(emphasis added and omitted). 
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trigger an inquiry into governmental purpose at all.117 Further, and more im-
portantly, focusing on whether the governmental purpose of a facially content-
based law at the time of its adoption was biased or benign toward that content 
does nothing to restrict who might be called the next bad actor: a governmental 
official who uses an existing facially content-based law for content-
discriminatory purposes.118 The Court has long been concerned with excessive 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert (Reed III),135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (citing Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). Indeed, the opinion in Ward itself deserves most of the 
blame for the expansion of government purpose analysis in cases involving content-based laws. See 
491 U.S. at 791 (“The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally 
and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation 
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” (emphasis added)). Lower courts’ 
treatment of that “speech cases generally” bit of dicta as establishing a rule of decision in cases in-
volving content-based laws was arguably consistent with the longstanding rule in many circuits to 
treat “Supreme Court dicta . . . as prophecy of what the Court might hold.” United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that Supreme Court 
dicta are “authoritative”) (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003)); Official 
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(en banc) (stating that although “the Supreme Court’s dicta are not binding,” the court “[does] not 
view it lightly”); Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 78 F.3d 659, 662 
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that “Supreme Court dicta tends to have somewhat greater force” than other 
dicta). The problem, however, was that the Court had already held, consistent with the Reed Two-
Step and contrary to the Ward dicta, that purpose could not play a role in analyzing the constitutionali-
ty of laws facially referencing content. See Reed III, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 (quoting, inter alia, City of 
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members 
of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991)); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 677–79 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[B]enign motivation, we have consistently held, is not enough to avoid the need for strict scrutiny of 
content-based justifications. . . . [W]e have often struck down statutes as being impermissibly content 
based even though their primary purpose was indubitably content neutral.”) (citations omitted). 
 Perhaps, then, the simplest way to think about Reed is that Justice Thomas’s opinion cleans up 
the stray dicta from Justice Kennedy’s Ward opinion regarding the application of purpose analysis to 
content-based laws—dicta that had been picked up on and carried forward with vigor by the lower 
courts. Justice Scalia had attempted a similar clean-up job in the Court’s 2000 case Hill v. Colorado, 
in which the Court began its content discrimination analysis by quoting Ward for the proposition that 
“the principal inquiry . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.” 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). Justice Scalia attacked this assertion, noting that content dis-
crimination analysis based on the government’s “disagreement with the message” conveyed was just 
one part of the inquiry into whether a particular law was content-based. Id. at 746–47 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Scalia’s contention as to Ward’s actu-
al reach, however, could not command a majority in that case. 
 118 To be fair, “the main concern in many cases will not be why the regulation was ‘adopted’; 
rather, it will be why the regulation was later applied in a given case . . . .” R. George Wright, Con-
tent-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the 
Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2086 (2015). This distinction itself, however, relies on the distinction 
between facial and as-applied challenges—which Reed has rendered irrelevant, at least to the content 
discrimination doctrine. Under Reed, if a law refers to content on its face, it is subject to strict scruti-
ny, irrespective of that law’s application to a particular speaker. 
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governmental discretion in the application of existing content-neutral laws, on 
the ground that such discretion “has the potential for becoming a means of 
suppressing a particular point of view.”119 It would be odd for the First 
Amendment to be oblivious to the same concern with respect to facially con-
tent-based laws—where the concern about censorially-motivated constructions 
of such laws by government officials should be at least as great. 
Minimizing the role government purpose should play when applying con-
tent discrimination doctrine as Reed instructs also clarifies an analysis that has 
become muddied to the point of obscurity. The purpose-based definition of a 
content-based law that had been adopted by the lower courts unnecessarily 
conflated the First Amendment’s content neutrality requirement with its view-
point neutrality requirement. As the Reed majority noted, the Town of Gilbert 
itself, mirroring how other governments had defended laws referencing content 
and following the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s holding in its favor, 
argued that its ordinance was content-neutral because it did not “single out” 
any particular “idea or viewpoint” for “differential treatment.”120 Nevertheless, 
arguing that a particular law is viewpoint-neutral is no defense to the claim that 
that law is content-based. Courts, commentators, lawyers, and law students 
have had enough trouble understanding and explaining the distinction between 
viewpoint neutrality and content neutrality.121 To the extent that Reed helps to 
draw a clearer demarcation between the two, all should be thankful. 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130–31 (1992) (quoting Heffron v. Int’l 
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U.S. 546, 553 (1975); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940)). 
 120 Reed III, 135 S. Ct. at 2222–23; see also Brief for Respondent at 22–31, Reed III, 135 S. Ct. 
2218 (2015) (No. 13-502), 2014 WL 6466937, at *22–31 (explaining why the ordinance should not be 
analyzed under strict scrutiny). The confusion was manifested in the lower court’s opinion in Reed, in 
which the Ninth Circuit had held that “[n]othing in the regulation suggests any intention by Gilbert to 
suppress certain ideas.” Reed I, 587 F.3d at 975. 
 121 See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531, 2543, 2551 (2014) (court splitting 5–4 
on whether regulation in question was content-neutral, content-based, or viewpoint-based); Norton, 
768 F.3d at 717 (“[I]t is difficult to be confident about how the line between subject-matter (usually 
allowed) and content-based (usually forbidden) distinctions is drawn.”); Barry P. McDonald, Speech 
and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1347, 1353, 1402 (2006) (stating that “the vagaries inherent in characterizing speech 
regulations as content-based versus content-neutral have resulted in standards for distinguishing be-
tween them that are applied in an inconsistent and results-driven manner,” and that the Court’s con-
tent-regulation analysis lacks a “principled and logical method”); Jay Alan Sekulow & Erik M. Zim-
merman, Uncertainty Is the Only Certainty: A Five-Category Test to Clarify the Unsure Boundaries 
Between Content-Based and Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech, 65 EMORY L.J. 455, 456 (2015) 
(“Although the distinctions between . . . content-based and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech 
remain a critically important aspect of First Amendment doctrine, the lines between these . . . catego-
ries remain quite unclear in key respects despite volumes of court decisions and scholarly commentary 
on the subject.”) (footnote omitted). In seeking to clarify those lines, the expert authors of the leading 
First Amendment treatise could do no better than this: 
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Finally, the Reed Two-Step’s minimization of the judicial inquiry into gov-
ernmental purpose brings First Amendment doctrine more in line with the rest of 
constitutional law. In other areas involving individual rights, the Court has been 
hesitant to turn its entire determination of a law’s constitutionality on the under-
lying purpose of that law. In short, purpose is both hard to find and slippery to 
the catch. As Justice Hugo Black wrote in the equal protection context: 
[I]t is extremely difficult for a court to ascertain the motivation, or 
collection of different motivations, that lie behind a legislative enact-
ment . . . . It is difficult or impossible for any court to determine the 
“sole” or “dominant” motivation behind the choices of a group of leg-
islators. Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a judicial at-
tempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. 
If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than because of its fa-
cial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the leg-
islature or relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons.122 
As Justice Black notes, constitutional law should be concerned with a 
law’s “facial effects”—i.e., the amount and nature of the constitutionally pro-
                                                                                                                           
A content-based regulation either explicitly or implicitly presumes to regulate speech 
on the basis of the substance of the message. A viewpoint-based law goes beyond mere 
content-based discrimination and regulates speech based upon agreement or disagree-
ment with the particular position the speaker wishes to express. Viewpoint discrimina-
tion is a subset of content discrimination; all viewpoint discrimination is first content 
discrimination, but not all content discrimination is viewpoint discrimination. 
1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3.9 (1994) (footnotes omit-
ted). This circumlocution, blame for which lies not with the treatise’s authors but with the doctrine’s 
development, calls to mind the classic colloquy: 
Abbott: Well, let’s see, we have on the bags, Who’s on first, What’s on second, I Don’t 
Know is on third . . .  
Costello: That’s what I want to find out. 
Abbott: I say Who’s on first, What’s on second, I Don’t Know’s on third. 
The Abbott and Costello Show (MCA television broadcast May 15, 1953). 
  122 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971). With respect to content-neutral re-
strictions on speech, the Court was initially dubious with respect to purpose as proof of unconstitu-
tionality. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“[U]nder settled principles the 
purpose of Congress . . . is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional.”); see also Mem-
bers of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 822–23 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (“[A] reviewing court faces substantial difficulties determining whether the actual objective is 
related to the suppression of speech [because] [t]he asserted interest in aesthetics may be only a façade 
for content-based suppression.”). In this sense, both the lower courts’ misapplications of the content 
discrimination doctrine, which permitted content-based laws to survive if they did not have a discrim-
inatory purpose, and the second step of the Reed two-step analysis, which permits a court to find a 
content-neutral law content-based if its purpose is to suppress content, represent a departure from this 
prior understanding. 
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tected activity that the law at issue prohibits, irrespective of its purpose. Con-
sidering the issue of effects in the First Amendment context leads to a different 
conclusion, well beyond the scope of Reed and the commentaries it has engen-
dered: the development of content discrimination doctrine has made the effects 
of particular laws on speakers nearly irrelevant to constitutional analysis. It is 
this fundamental problem—and not cases at the margins like Reed—that has 
set First Amendment doctrine on the wrong track. 
III. THE TRUE PROBLEM: THE CONTENT-BASED V. CONTENT-NEUTRAL 
APPROACH (OR “PURPOSE: YES, EFFECTS: NO”) 
The distinction between content-based and content-neutral laws that Reed 
sought to clarify has earned significant scholarly attention.123 It is also a di-
chotomy upon which the Supreme Court has come to completely rely. If there 
is one First Amendment rule that is clearer than any other, it is that the deter-
mination that a regulation is content-based or content-neutral will almost al-
ways determine if the regulation will be invalidated or upheld.124 
Which label applies to the speech at issue is a question that Reed helpful-
ly clarifies. The effect of the chosen label, however, is a much more constitu-
tionally consequential issue. Unpacking the two-tiered-content approach shows 
that it directly contributes to the underprotection of speech. There is no princi-
pled basis for treating content-neutral restrictions with the leniency that current 
doctrine provides. It is this fact—not the Reed Two-Step—which should con-
cern scholars and advocates of free expression. By giving content-neutral re-
strictions only the most cursory level of review regardless of those restrictions’ 
effects on speakers—and with the help of a scholarly community that has not 
challenged and thus ratified this aspect of free speech doctrine—the First 
Amendment has lost its way. 
As Reed recognizes, the governing rule in applying the First Amendment 
is the distinction between “restrictions that turn on the content of expression” 
on the one hand, which “are subjected to a strict form of judicial review” and 
restrictions that are “concerned with matters other than content” on the other, 
which “receive more limited examination.”125 A serious incongruity exists, 
however, in setting a standard of review for a speech restriction based solely 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 113, 114 (1981); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert (Reed III), 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227–32 
(2015) (explaining why the regulation is content-based and why strict scrutiny applies). 
 124 See McDonald, supra note 121, at 1351; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a 
Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 49, 53 (2000) (“[V]irtually every free speech case turns on the application of the distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral laws.”). 
 125 Redish, supra note 123, at 113. 
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on whether the restriction refers to content. Content-based restrictions are more 
rigorously reviewed despite the fact that in many, if not most cases, a content-
neutral restriction in operation can, and often does, limit far more speech than 
one that is content-based. 
For instance, imagine two hypothetical laws, both passed to deter dis-
tracted driving: Law 1 bans bumper stickers on cars, and Law 2 bans only 
bumper stickers referring to politics. (Perhaps the legislature that adopted Law 
2 believed that politically themed bumper stickers were particularly distracting 
or were more likely than other kinds of more topically benign stickers to send 
drivers into a road rage, resulting in dangerous violence on the roadways.126) 
Law 1 is content-neutral because it is “justified without reference to the con-
tent” of the speech that the law proscribes.127 At most, it is aimed at a mode of 
expression, not expression itself. Law 2, by contrast, is clearly content-based 
because it imposes a “burden on speakers because of the content of their 
speech” or its communicative impact.128 So, even though Law 1 will unques-
tionably suppress more speech because it bars bumper stickers that discuss all 
topics, not just politics,129 Law 2’s constitutionality will be reviewed under a 
much less deferential standard of review. 
This is so, goes First Amendment theory, because, even if content-based 
restrictions result in the suppression of less speech, those restrictions have a 
skewing effect on public discourse, as they deprive the market of ideas of 
speech to which the government doing the suppressing might be hostile.130 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Under the secondary effects doctrine, a regulation that refers to content can nevertheless be 
deemed content-neutral if the regulation is aimed not at the referred-to content but at the content’s 
undesirable “secondary effects.” City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–52 
(1986). Nevertheless, even under the secondary effects doctrine, “[l]isteners’ reaction to speech is not 
a content-neutral basis for regulation.” Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 
(1992); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (“[T]he emotive impact of speech on its 
audience is not a ‘secondary effect’ unrelated to the content of the expression itself.” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 127 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1994)). 
 128 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 
(1991) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)); see also John Hart Ely, Flag Desecra-
tion: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1497 (1975); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 46, 47 (1987) (“Content-based restrictions limit communication because of the message it con-
veys.”). 
 129 See Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 
10 (1986) (“[A] limited abridgment of political speech may be less harmful than a more sweeping 
abridgement of nonpolitical speech.”). 
 130 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF 
THE PEOPLE 27 (1965); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 446–51 (1996); see also Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 197–98 (1983) 
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(Again, here, note how all the talk of government hostility to certain ideas con-
tributes to the confusion between content discrimination and viewpoint dis-
crimination—indeed, the entire theory of content discrimination doctrine is 
premised upon that confusion.) Content discrimination doctrine presumes that 
governments intend to create this skewing effect in the direction it prefers pub-
lic debate take; thus the heightened suspicion applied to content-based regula-
tions. In other words, the First Amendment is primarily directed not at gov-
ernment interferences with speech per se, but at those interferences that are 
based on bias against certain speech.131 The animating concern is with gov-
ernment distortion of public debate rather than with the sum total of public 
debating—that is, the First Amendment “focuses not so much on what is re-
stricted but on the reasons for the restriction.”132 Similarly, Jed Rubenfeld, who 
argues even more forcefully for a purposivist application of the Speech Clause, 
claims that “[t]he First Amendment is implicated [only] when the government 
makes communicative harm the basis for liability”—unless “speech [is] the 
real target” of the government’s action, the First Amendment should not be 
concerned at all.133 To boil all this down, a law’s reference to content raises a 
yellow caution flag for the possible presence of a governmental purpose to-
ward that content that may not be benign; hence, applying strict scrutiny to 
suss out the government’s true purpose, as opposed to its claimed one, is ap-
propriate. 
By contrast, this argument continues, content-neutral regulations do not 
intend to skew speech in any particular topical direction and are thus not sus-
                                                                                                                           
(stating that “the first amendment is concerned . . . with the extent to which the law distorts public 
debate”). It is in this sense that First Amendment doctrine seems to share much with the law of equal 
protection; concerns with content-based laws are based not so much on “the restrictive effect on 
communication . . . as the differential treatment of categories of speech.” Daniel A. Farber, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 731 (1979) (footnote 
omitted); see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1680 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Among its other functions, the First Amendment is a kind of Equal Protection Clause for ideas. The 
state ordinarily may not regulate one message because it harms a government interest yet refuse to 
regulate other messages that impair the interest in a comparable way.”). 
 131 See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2172 
(2015). As Professor Lakier noted: 
[Subjecting content-based restrictions to higher scrutiny] is motivated by the belief that 
allowing the government to restrict speech on the basis of its content threatens both 
democracy (by allowing the government to repress the speech of those groups it dis-
likes or who criticize it) and social progress (by allowing the government to remove 
ideas from competition in the public marketplace). 
Id. 
 132 FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 68–69 (1982) (citing 
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972)). 
 133 Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 777–78 (2001) (em-
phasis and footnote omitted). 
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pect. The state’s first obligation under the Speech Clause is to treat ideas equal-
ly and impartially, and content-neutral restrictions treat ideas equally and im-
partially, irrespective of the nature or number of ideas that they actually re-
strict.134 Additionally, because a content-neutral regulation treats all ideas 
equally, the review of that regulation, though (nominally) searching, will ac-
commodate the government interest behind the restriction to a much greater 
degree.135 As Ed Baker notes, “the issue” with respect to content-neutral re-
strictions “is resource allocation, not censorship.”136 
To demonstrate this incongruity graphically, we can use three other hypo-
thetical laws, this time involving restrictions on the use of yard signs:  
The anti-war sign ban represented on the right side of the diagram, because 
it is viewpoint-based, will receive the most scrutiny by a reviewing court, and is 
certain to be found invalid.137 Moving right-to-left along the diagram, scrutiny of 
 
134 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 776 
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that the government’s inability to abridge speech because of 
its content is the “cardinal principle of the First Amendment”); see also Stone, supra note 130, at 202–
04. To take another example, consider Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, a Supreme Court case decid-
ed in 1975. 422 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1975). There, the Court found that Jacksonville could not bar 
drive-ins from showing films containing nudity that were visible from a public street because the 
ordinance in question treated such films differently from films not containing that content. Id. A blan-
ket restriction on any films viewable from the street, however, would likely have been subjected (at 
most) only to intermediate scrutiny even though the latter restriction would result in far fewer films 
being shown in Jacksonville. Again, the First Amendment harm is measured not by the total amount 
of speech suppressed but rather by the unequal treatment of the restricted speech in question. 
 135 Stone, supra note 130, at 192–93. 
 136 C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, 
and Manner Regulations, 78 NW. U.L. REV. 937, 939 (1983). 
 137 See, e.g., Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 
(1984) (concluding that viewpoint-based restrictions on citizens’ political speech were per se invalid); 
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785–86 (1978) (noting that the First Amendment is 
especially “offended” when the government discriminates on the basis of viewpoint); Farber, supra 
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the middle restriction will remain strict, as that ban’s limitation on political con-
tent (as well as its failure to differentiate between speech that is for or against a 
particular political position) renders it content-based. Finally, the total ban on 
signs shown at the diagram’s left would likely be deemed content-neutral and 
thus subjected to what passes in the speech context for intermediate scrutiny—a 
level of review that is, as several scholars have shown, “in practice a highly def-
erential form of review which virtually all laws pass.”138 
By contrast, it is similarly clear that in terms of the respective laws’ ef-
fects, the amount of speech, as well as the number of speakers restricted, dras-
tically decreases as one moves from left-to-right:  
As an initial matter, note that the presumption that content-neutral laws 
burden all speech equally is fundamentally false. So far as all of the theoretical 
bases underlying the First Amendment are concerned, an anti-war yard sign 
speaks more than a yard sign that communicates no viewpoint at all. The in-
versely proportional relationship between the amount of speech suppressed and 
 
note 130, at 729 (“[R]egulatory classifications based on the speaker’s viewpoint are subject to strict 
scrutiny, and other content-based classifications are subject to . . . milder scrutiny.”). 
 138 Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 237 (2012) (citing 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997)); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293; Members of the 
City Council of L.A., 466 U.S. at 804–05); see also Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Inci-
dental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 925 (1993) (discussing 
that “[t]he government has always won” cases in which the regulation at issue was deemed content-
neutral by a reviewing court); McDonald, supra note 121, at 1370 (“In the fourteen cases . . . where 
the Court has determined or assumed that a speech regulation is content-neutral and has reviewed it 
under this standard or a close variant, just two of those regulations failed to pass review and only 
because they involved broad or total bans on the use of popular mediums of expression in places 
where such restrictions on speech seemed especially inappropriate.” (footnote omitted)); Frederick 
Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Communica-
tions, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 788 (1985) (stating that in practice, intermediate scrutiny review 
of speech restrictions “has resembled rational basis review”); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimina-
tion and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 647 (1991) (noting that the application of 
content-neutral intermediate scrutiny in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) “presaged the 
lax and deferential way in which it has been used ever since”) (footnote omitted). But see McCullen v. 
Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014) (holding that a content-neutral law was not narrowly tailored). 
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the level of scrutiny applied, however, is irrelevant in the eyes of First 
Amendment doctrine.139 This is so even though the incongruity creates per-
verse incentives for government. As then-Justice William Rehnquist noted over 
thirty years ago, “the State would fare better by adopting more restrictive 
means, a judicial incentive I had thought this Court would hesitate to af-
ford.”140 Accordingly, where governments are faced with the decision of 
whether to “tolerate all speech or none at all,” it is unsurprising that they choose 
the latter course regularly.141 Furthermore, note also under this hypothetical that 
the effect on the anti-war protester’s expressive rights—the speaker whom the 
First Amendment is most committed to protect, at least in theory—is actually the 
same under any of the three bans. Again, however, a regulation’s effects on 
speech, either on the speaker or his or her intended audience, are not the concern 
of current free speech doctrine. The government’s presumed purpose, rather than 
the regulation’s restrictive effect, is the basis for deciding the applicable stand-
ard of review and thus the First Amendment issue. 
Further, the ample alternative channels analysis—an inquiry as to whether 
an infringed speaker could have expressed his or her message in another lawful 
way despite the restriction at issue—is part of the lesser standard of review but 
not the more rigorous one. Because a content-neutral regulation’s effects are, 
as a matter of course, deemed by a reviewing court to infringe upon, at most, a 
means or locus of expression and not the expression’s content, the speaker re-
stricted by such a regulation is presumed to have been free to shift to another 
means or locus to express the same message. Accordingly, the content of that 
speaker’s message remains theoretically able to reach its intended listeners and 
contribute to public debate.142 For example, a driver who is unable to express 
his or her political views through a bumper sticker pursuant to hypothetical 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: The Doc-
trine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 757, 792 (1986) 
(“[T]he Court’s assessment of a regulation’s burden on expression is tied to its finding that the regula-
tion is facially content neutral with little regard for discriminatory effects.”). 
 140 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 475 (1980) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (emphasis omitted); see 
also Redish, supra note 123, at 137 (stating that “[i]n a perverse sense . . . it appears that the more 
expression we prohibit, the closer we come to attaining the goal of the equality principle” supporting 
strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions). 
 141 John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (2005) (citing Utah Gospel 
Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1208–17 (D. Utah 2004), and describing Salt 
Lake City’s decision to vacate a public easement over a downtown plaza after litigation determined 
that the easement made the plaza a public forum). 
 142 Harold L. Quadres, Content-Neutral Public Forum Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic 
State Interest, the Fall of Judicial Scrutiny, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 439, 480 (1986) (“[I]f one could argue 
that, despite the questioned regulation, a speaker still has numerous alternative means by which to 
disseminate his message, the degree of first amendment injury may seem insubstantial . . . [because 
t]he speaker can always make use of his alternative access.”). 
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Law 1 above is free to communicate them in other ways, such as yard signs, 
blog posts, and the like. This fact alone makes Law 1 likely to survive judicial 
review under current law.143 Nevertheless, the availability of those alterna-
tives—and make no mistake, a reviewing court’s conclusion as to their exist-
ence or absence has become the dispositive question with respect to the law’s 
constitutionality144—is part of First Amendment scrutiny only when the law in 
question is deemed content-neutral. The driver restricted under the hypothet-
ical content-based Law 2, which bars only political bumper stickers, is similar-
ly limited from expressing political views in the particular manner chosen but 
is similarly as free to express his or her political views through the same alter-
native channels as the driver who is barred by the general ban on bumper 
stickers. Yet, the availability of those alternative channels is irrelevant to a re-
viewing court once Law 2 is deemed content-based. 
This distinction is entirely inconsistent with a theory that calls content-
based laws into greater question because they might be proxies for a govern-
mental intent to discriminate against the category of content to which a law 
refers. If government purpose is the actual touchstone for determining a law’s 
constitutionality, then alternative channels should be just as relevant to the 
speaker who is infringed by a content-based law as by a content-neutral one. If 
such channels exist, then the government’s attempt to squelch speech in a cer-
tain category of conduct through a content-based restriction has failed—which 
should lead one to question whether the presumption regarding the govern-
ment’s intent behind the reference to content was malignant in the first 
place.145 If the government’s purported purpose has been frustrated by the 
availability of the substitute, then the purported purpose may not have been the 
actual purpose. At which point, the presumption underlying content discrimi-
nation doctrine is doing no analytical work at all. 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See generally Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative Channels” Flaw in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1657 (2016) (explaining that “if the regulation leaves open 
‘ample alternative channels of communication’ for the restricted speaker’s expression,” the courts will 
not strike down the law). 
 144 See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 790 (noting that in content-neutral cases, “the 
Court will uphold regulations of speech so long as, in its view, the regulation keeps open for that 
speaker ample alternative, and effective, channels of communication” (emphasis omitted)); Quadres, 
supra note 142, at 490 (stating that the “alternative access question” is the “touchstone of the whole 
balancing process” in assessing content-neutral regulations); see also Armijo, supra note 143, at 1661 
(arguing that a law’s restriction leaving open other means of communication has “dispositive signifi-
cance in speech cases”). 
 145 See Kagan, supra note 130, at 446 (a content-based restriction makes “the danger of distortion 
[of public debate] insignificant” if it affects a “small quantity of speech” and leaves “alternative 
means to communicate the ‘handicapped’ idea” readily available to speakers). 
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For example, if, during a particularly taxing basketball season, the cam-
pus of the University of North Carolina were to ban burning the university’s 
basketball coach in effigy, the fact that the campus said nothing about other 
expressions of critique might lead one to conclude that the concern behind the 
ban was not about squelching dissent but fires on campus.146 Under current 
law, however, purpose, whether fulfilled or not, sets out the boundaries for the 
entire inquiry. Because First Amendment law presumes that content-based re-
strictions are unconstitutional because they have a discriminatory purpose and 
presumes that content-neutral restrictions are benign because they are not 
aimed at suppressing speech, a particular law’s effects on speech are given no 
weight. This is exactly wrong. The presumed constitutionality of a given law 
should turn not on what First Amendment doctrine assumes is its purpose but 
rather on how much or what kind of speech it actually infringes. 
Of course, First Amendment doctrine recognizes the principle that harm 
rather than purpose is the true constitutional evil in all sorts of contexts even if 
it fails to give it any meaningful value in deciding actual cases. The market-
place of ideas, self-autonomy, and self-governance theories of the First 
Amendment all relate to the effects of potentially speech-infringing laws: a 
speech market functions less properly if government deprives that market of 
expressive ideas; members of society cannot reach their best selves if the law 
deprives them of the capacity for expression; and without access to relevant 
information concerning governors and governance, individual and collective 
political choices are less informed and thus less legitimate. Again, these are all 
concerns tied to law’s effects, not law’s purpose. The Supreme Court has used 
the term “chilling effect” almost one hundred fifty times, mostly in the over-
breadth context.147 So how does it make sense to consider a law’s effects on 
speech prospectively but not retrospectively? 
Finally, and coming full circle, consider how a First Amendment doctrine 
focused more on effects than purpose might better resolve those issues that 
have drawn the most concern from Reed’s critics. If a law’s effects on speech 
were the First Amendment’s guiding concern, then courts could prioritize con-
sideration of the interests of the infringed speaker over the government’s rea-
sons for the infringement. Signage restrictions would or would not survive 
constitutional scrutiny based not on whether they refer to content, but on 
whether the claimed interest in those restrictions outweighs the infringed 
speaker’s interest in communicating his or her message through a sign. Pan-
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Armijo, supra note 143, at 1726 (“Government arguments that a speaker’s message is not 
limited to the mode of expression that the regulation bars, and that the regulation’s harm to speech is 
thus minimal, are not a part of the decision-making calculus for content-based laws.”). 
 147 A search of law review articles for use of the term “chilling effect” on Westlaw produced 
nearly 9700 results. 
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handling bans could not be saved through the broadening exercise of content-
neutral legislative drafting—recall that per the analysis in Part I, a content-
neutral law that prohibits standing in the median is much more likely to sur-
vive scrutiny than a narrow content-based law that bans panhandling in the 
median—but instead will stand or fall based on the degree to which the ban at 
issue interferes with protected speech.148 Additionally, a stock offeror’s interest 
in being free from the compulsion to reveal information concerning the object 
of the stock would fall to the government’s interest in providing information to 
consumers that would otherwise not be disclosed. 
CONCLUSION 
Current content discrimination doctrine relies on the law’s references to 
content—or the lack thereof—as proxies for purpose. Critics of the Supreme 
Court’s 2015 holding in Reed v. Town of Gilbert would prefer to expand the 
role of governmental purpose in the review of laws infringing on speech to an 
even greater degree—to the point of making a facial reference to content not 
just a proxy for censorial intent but a starting point to deciding whether a be-
nign purpose exists that can save the content-based law in question. Just as the 
First Amendment has achieved speaker agnosticism, however, it should be mo-
tive-agnostic as well. By limiting judicial inquiry into governmental purpose to 
the review of content-neutral laws, Reed has ameliorated this problem, not ex-
acerbated it. The less consideration of purpose in First Amendment analysis, 
the better off speakers will be. 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See Traditionalist Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Desloge, No. 4:13-CV-810 
NAB, 2016 WL 705128, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2016) (an ordinance barring any “person [from] 
stand[ing] in . . . a [r]oadway for the purpose of distributing anything to the occupant of any vehicle” 
was content-neutral and constitutional) (quoting DESLOGE, MO, CODE § 220.205 (2013)). But see 
Cutting v. City of Portland, 802 F.3d 79, 84–85, 89 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding that even though a ban on 
standing in any road median in Portland was content-neutral because it “restrict[ed] speech only on 
the basis of where such speech takes place,” it nevertheless violated the First Amendment because it 
imposed “serious burdens on speech”). 
